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Abstract—Cascading failures are one of the main reasons
for blackouts in electrical power grids. Stable power supply
requires a robust design of the power grid topology. Currently,
the impact of the grid structure on the grid robustness is mainly
assessed by purely topological metrics, that fail to capture the
fundamental properties of the electrical power grids such as
power flow allocation according to Kirchhoff’s laws. This paper
deploys the effective graph resistance as a metric to relate the
topology of a grid to its robustness against cascading failures.
Specifically, the effective graph resistance is deployed as a metric
for network expansions (by means of transmission line additions)
of an existing power grid. Four strategies based on network prop-
erties are investigated to optimize the effective graph resistance,
accordingly to improve the robustness, of a given power grid
at a low computational complexity. Experimental results suggest
the existence of Braess’s paradox in power grids: bringing an
additional line into the system occasionally results in decrease of
the grid robustness. This paper further investigates the impact of
the topology on the Braess’s paradox, and identifies specific sub-
structures whose existence results in Braess’s paradox. Careful
assessment of the design and expansion choices of grid topologies
incorporating the insights provided by this paper optimizes the
robustness of a power grid, while avoiding the Braess’s paradox
in the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electrical power grid is crucial for economic prosperi-
ties of modern societies. Disruptions to electrical power grids
paralyze the daily life and cause huge economical and social
costs for these societies [4], [14], [27]. The strong dependency
of other crucial infrastructures such as telecommunication,
transportation and water supply on electrical power grids
amplifies the severity of large scale blackouts [11]. The key
importance of the power grid encourages further research
into sustaining power system reliability and developing new
approaches to evaluate and mitigate the risk of cascading
blackouts.
Cascading failures are one of the main reasons for large
scale blackouts [5]. Cascading failures are the consequence of
the collective dynamics of a complex power grid. Large scale
cascades are typically due to the propagation of a local failure
into the global network [30]. Consequently, analyzing and
mitigating cascading failures requires a system level approach.
Recent advances in the field of network science [6], [12]
provide the promising potential of complex network theory
to investigate the robustness of power grids at a system level.
The robustness of power grids in this paper refers to their
maintenance of function after cascading failures triggered by
targeted attacks.
Analyzing and improving the network robustness includes
two parts. The first goal is the proposal of a proper metric that
characterizes the robustness of a specific class of networks
[20]. A second goal is to propose efficient strategies on graph
modification in order to increase the value of the proposed
robustness metric. Consequently, an effective robustness metric
that incorporates the essence of the power grids and effective
strategies for graph modification are required to improve the
robustness of power grids.
The effective graph resistance is a graph metric which char-
acterizes the essence of electrical power grids such as power
flow allocation according to Kirchhoff’s laws. Researchers
in [15] show that the effective graph resistance effectively
captures the impact of cascading failures in a power grid. The
lower the effective graph resistance is, the more robust a power
grid is against cascading failures. Adding a link decreases the
effective graph resistance [7]. This paper focuses on enhancing
the grid robustness against cascading failures by applying the
effective graph resistance as a metric for network expansion.
Determining the right pair of nodes to connect in order
to maximize the robustness is a challenge. Exhaustive search,
i.e. checking all the possibilities, is computationally expensive.
Compared to exhaustive search, this paper proposes four
strategies that provide a trade-off between a higher decrease
of the effective graph resistance and a lower computational
complexity.
Exhaustively evaluating the impact of each link addition on
robustness reveals the occurrence of Braess’s paradox in power
grids. Braess’s paradox, originally found in traffic networks
[2], shows that adding a link can decrease the robustness of the
network. Specific sub-structures that might result in Braess’s
paradox by adding an extra link are investigated. Simulation
results indicate that the effective graph resistance effectively
identifies a link whose addition increases the robustness while
avoids the Braess’s paradox. Moreover, most of the strategies
highly increase the robustness at a low computational com-
plexity.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the model of cascading failures in power grids. Section III
presents the computation of the effective graph resistance in
power grids. Strategies to add a transmission line are illustrated
in Section IV. The experimental methodology is illustrated
in Section V and the improvement of the grid robustness is
evaluated in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MODEL OF CASCADING FAILURES IN POWER GRIDS
A power grid is a three-layered network consisting of gen-
eration, transmission and distribution parts. A graph can rep-
resent a power grid where nodes are generation, transmission,
distribution buses and substations, and links are transmission
lines. Additionally, links are weighted by the admittance (or
impedance) values of the corresponding transmission lines.
Electrical power in a grid is distributed according to Kir-
choff’s laws. Accordingly, impedances, voltage levels at each
individual power station, voltage phase differences between
power stations and loads at terminal stations control the power
flow in the grid. This paper approximates the flow values in a
grid by using a linear DC flow equation [21] that approximates
the nonlinear AC power flow equation [10].
The maximum capacity Cl of a line l is defined as the
maximum power flow that can be afforded by the line. As in
[15], we assume that the maximum capacity of a transmission
line is proportional to its initial load Ll(0) as follows:
Cl = αlLl(0) (1)
where αl is called the tolerance parameter of the line l.
In a power grid, transmission lines are protected by relays
and circuit breakers. A relay of a transmission line measures
the load of that line and compares the load with the maximum
capacity Cl computed by equation (1). When the maximum
capacity is violated, and this violation lasts long enough, the
relay notifies a circuit breaker to trip the transmission line
in order to prevent the line from permanent damage due to
overloading. We assume a deterministic model for the line
tripping mechanism. A circuit breaker trips at the moment the
load of a transmission line exceeds its maximum capacity.
The failure of a transmission line changes the balance of
the power flow distribution over the grid and causes a redis-
tribution of the power flow over the network. This dynamic
response of the system to this triggering event might over-
load other transmission lines in the network. The protection
mechanism trips these newly overloaded transmission lines and
the power flow is again redistributed potentially resulting in
new overloads. This cascading failure continues until no more
transmission lines are overloaded.
III. EFFECTIVE GRAPH RESISTANCE IN POWER GRIDS
This section explains the complex network preliminaries,
presents the effective graph resistance, and elaborates on how
it is computed in electric power grids.
A. Complex Network Preliminaries
The topology of complex networks can be represented by
a graph G(N,L) consisting of N nodes connected by L links.
Graphs with N nodes are completely described by an N ×N
adjacency matrix A, in which the element aij = 1 if there is
a link between nodes i and j, otherwise aij = 0. In case of
a weighted graph, the network is represented by the weighted
adjacency matrix W where the element wij is a real number
that characterizes a certain property of the link i ∼ j. The
weight can be distances in transportation networks, the delay
in the Internet, the strength of the interaction in the brain
networks, and so on.
The weighted Laplacian matrix Q = ∆−W of G is an N×
N matrix, where ∆ = diag(di) is the N ×N diagonal degree
matrix with the element di =
∑N
j=1 wij . The eigenvalues of
Q are non-negative and at least one is zero [22]. Thus, the
smallest eigenvalue of Q is zero. The eigenvalues of Q are
ordered as 0 = µN ≤ µN−1 ≤ . . . ≤ µ1.
Graph metrics measure the structural and spectral prop-
erties of networks. The degree di of a node i specifies the
number of connected neighbours to that node. The largest
eigenvalue λ1 (also called the spectral radius) of the adjacency
matrix highly influences the dynamic processes on networks
such as virus spreading and synchronization processes [19].
The eigenvector corresponding to the spectral radius is called
principle eigenvector x1 that characterizes the influence of
link/node removal on spectral radius [17], [25]. The second
smallest eigenvalue µN−1 of the Laplacian matrix Q is coined
by Fiedler [8] as the algebraic connectivity αG. The corre-
sponding eigenvector is called the Fiedler vector. The entries of
the Fiedler vector provide a powerful heuristic for community
detection and graph partitioning [18]. The strategies illustrated
in Section IV are based on these structural and spectral graph
metrics.
B. Effective graph resistance in power grids
Effective resistance Rij is the electrical resistance between
nodes i and j computed by series and parallel manipulations
when a graph is seen as an electrical circuit where each link
in the graph has a unit resistance. According to the Ohm’s
law, the effective resistance is the potential difference between
nodes i and j when a unit current is injected at node i and
withdrawn at node j. The effective graph resistance RG is the
sum of the effective resistance over all pairs of nodes RG =∑N
i=1
∑N
j=i+1 Rij .
Computation of the effective graph resistance for a power
grid necessitates the topology of the grid (i.e. interconnection
of nodes) and reactance (or susceptance) values of the trans-
mission lines in the grid. The weighted Laplacian matrix Q of
a power grid reflects the interconnection of nodes by transmis-
sion lines. The weight wij corresponds to the susceptance (the
inverse of reactance) value of the line l = i ∼ j. The effective
resistance Rij between a pair of nodes is computed as [22]:
Rij =
(
Qˆ−1
)
ii
+
(
Qˆ−1
)
jj
− 2
(
Qˆ−1
)
ij
(2)
where Qˆ−1 is the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of the Q.
In terms of eigenvalues of the weighted Laplacian matrix
Q, the effective graph resistance can be written as [22]
RG = N
N−1∑
i=1
1
µi
(3)
where µi is the ith eigenvalue of Q and N is the number
of nodes in a power grid. In this paper, we use equation (3),
which is computationally efficient, to compute the effective
graph resistance.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR ADDING A TRANSMISSION LINE
As a response to blackouts, additional transmission lines
are placed aiming to increase the robustness of power grids.
Determining the right pair of nodes to connect in order to max-
imize the robustness is the challenge. An exhaustive search,
identifying the best pair of nodes to connect by checking
all Lc =
(
N
2
)
− L possibilities, is computationally expensive
especially when the number of nodes increases. Therefore,
strategies that determine the transmission line to be added
based on topological and spectral properties of a network,
provide a trade-off between a scalable computation and a high
increase of the grid robustness.
Topological and spectral metrics, such as degree, algebraic
connectivity and spectral radius, characterize the connectivity
of a network and highly influence the dynamic processes
executed on a network [8], [23]. The effective graph resistance
is shown to be able to anticipate the robustness of power grids
with respect to cascading failures [15]. This section investi-
gates four strategies, studied in [28], for selecting a link whose
addition potentially minimizes the effective graph resistance
and accordingly maximizes the robustness. A strategy defines
a link l = i ∼ j and the selection of nodes i and j for each
strategy are illustrated in the rest of this section.
A. Degree product
The nodes i and j have the minimum product of degrees
min(didj). If there are multiple node pairs with the same
minimum product of degrees, one of these pairs is randomly
chosen.
The complexity for the strategy is O(N2 − N + 2Lc)
computed as follows: (i) O(N(N − 1)) is for counting the
degrees of all the nodes. (ii) O(2Lc) is for computing didj
for Lc unconnected node pairs and for finding min(didj).
B. Principle eigenvector
The nodes i and j correspond to the ith and jth components
of the principal eigenvector x1 that have the maximum product
max((x1)i(x1)j) of the principle eigenvector components. The
principal eigenvector x1 belongs to the largest eigenvalue of
the weighted adjacency matrix W .
The complexity is O(N3 + 2Lc) computed as follows: (i)
O(N3) is for computing the principle eigenvector x1 assuming
the adoption of the QR algorithm [9] for computation. (ii)
O(2Lc) is for computing (x1)i(x1)j for Lc unconnected node
pairs and for finding max((x1)i(x1)j).
C. Fiedler vector
The nodes i and j correspond to the ith and jth components
of the Fiedler vector y that satisfy ∆y = max(|yi−yj|), where
|yi − yj | is the absolute difference between the ith and jth
components of the Fiedler vector [26].
The complexity is O(N3 + 2Lc) computed as follows:
(i) O(N3) is for computing the Fiedler vector yi by the QR
algorithm [9]. (ii) O(2Lc) is for computing |yi − yj | for Lc
unconnected node pairs and for finding max|yi − yj|.
D. Effective resistance
The nodes i and j have the highest effective resistance
max(Rij). The pairwise effective resistance Rij is computed
by equation (2).
TABLE I: A summary of the strategies and the order of their
computational complexity.
Node i Node j Complexity Order
DegProd arg min
i,j
(didj) O(N
2)
PrinEigen argmax
i,j
((x1)i(x1)j) O(N
3)
FiedlerVector arg max
i,j
(|yi − yj |) O(N
3)
EffecResis argmax
i,j
(Rij) O(N
3)
Exhaustive Search arg min
i,j
(RG) O(N
5)
The complexity is O(N3 + 4Lc) computed as follows: (i)
O(N3) is for computing Q̂−1. (ii) O(4Lc) is for computing
Rij for Lc unconnected node pairs and for finding the maxi-
mum Rij .
Table I summarizes all the strategies that identify a link
l = i ∼ j and the order of their corresponding computational
complexity. Table I also presents the complexity order of the
exhaustive search in order to compare with the complexity
of the four strategies. The complexity order O(N5) of the
exhaustive search is computed by O(N2) for checking all the
possibilities multiplied by O(N3) for computing the effective
graph resistance after a link addition.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The experimental method presented in this section eval-
uates the robustness of the improved power system against
cascading failures triggered by deliberate attacks. This ap-
proach can be used to assess the performance of the effective
graph resistance as a metric for link addition on improving the
robustness of power grids. This section elaborates on attack
strategies and the quantification of the grid robustness after
cascading failures.
A. Attack Strategies
This paper designs attack strategies based on electrical
node significance centrality and link betweenness centrality.
The electrical node significance [14] is a flow-based measure
for node centrality, specifically designed for power grids. The
electrical node significance δi of a node i is defined as the
total power Pi distributed by node i normalized by the total
amount of power that is distributed in the entire grid:
δi =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
(4)
An attack based on δi refers to target the link incident to the
node i that has the highest electrical node significance. Since
node i has the number di of incident links, the link with the
highest load is chosen.
The link betweenness centrality is a topological graph
metric quantifying the centrality of a link in complex networks
[24]. The betweenness centrality of a link is defined as the total
number of the shortest paths that traverse the link l.
Bl =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
1l∈P(i,j) (5)
where 1{x} is the indicator function: 1{x} = 1 if the condition
{x} is true, else 1{x} = 0, and P(i, j) is the shortest path
between nodes i and j. An attack based on betweenness cen-
trality targets the link with the highest betweenness centrality.
Placing an additional line according to different strategies
(presented in Section IV) results in different improved power
systems. In order to compare cascading damages of these
improved systems, we always attack the same link identified by
the node significance centrality or link betweenness centrality
of the original power grid.
B. Robustness Evaluation
The robustness of power grids is evaluated by the criticality
of the additional line and the damages after cascading failures
triggered by targeted attacks. To assess the criticality of the
newly added transmission line based on the effective graph
resistance, we deploy an analogous approach as in [16]: the
criticality of an added line l in a graph G is determined by the
relative decrease of the effective graph resistance ∆RlG that is
caused by the addition of a link l:
∆RlG =
RG −RG+l
RG
(6)
where RG+l is the effective graph resistance of the grid after
adding a link l into G. Evaluation of equation (6) results in
the theoretical robustness level of a power grid.
Initially, a transmission line identified by the four strategies
and exhaustive search is added into the power grid. Then, the
newly obtained grids are attacked and the cascading damages
are quantified.
The damage caused by the cascade is quantified in terms of
normalized served power demand DS: served power demand
divided by the total power demand in the network. Computing
the normalized served demand for an interval of tolerance
parameters [αmin, αmax] results in a robustness curve of a grid.
The normalized area below the robustness curve is computed
by a Riemann sum [24]:
r =
∑m+1
i=1 DS(αi)∆α
αmax − αmin
(7)
where the closed interval [αmin, αmax] is equally partitioned
by m points and the length of the resulting interval is ∆α =
αmax−αmin
m+1 . DS(αi) is the normalized served demand when
the tolerance parameter of the network is αi ∈ [αmin + (i −
1)∆α, αmin + i∆α]. Since the maximum value of DS is 1,
(αmax − αmin) refers to the maximum possible area below
the robustness curve ensuring that the value of r is between
0 and 1. Evaluation of equation (7) for the robustness curve
results in the experimental robustness level of a power grid
with respect to cascading failures.
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
This section investigates the effectiveness of the effective
graph resistance as a metric for line addition, the impact
of structures on the Braess’s paradox, and the performance
of the four strategies. First, the power grid is expanded by
adding single links according to the minimization of the
effective graph resistance, and the criteria of the four strategies.
Then, the robustness of the improved power grid is assessed
quantitatively under targeted attacks.
A. Assessing effectiveness of the effective graph resistance
Exhaustively adding all the possible links provides us
all the possibly improved grids. Quantifying the cascading
damages of all the improved grids under targeted attacks
provides the benchmark for the evaluation of the effective
graph resistance. The reactance value on each added line is
assumed to be the average of all the existing transmission
lines. The simulations are performed by MATCASC [13], a
MATLAB based cascading failures analysis tool implementing
the model in Section II.
Figure 1 shows the performance of the effective graph
resistance on identifying a critical link under a fixed tolerance
parameter α = 2 in IEEE 57 and 118 power systems. There
are 1518 possible improved grids by adding a line to IEEE 57
and 6724 possible improved grids to IEEE 118. The original
and improved power systems are attacked based on the node
significance centrality computed by equation (4). In Figure 1,
the horizontal line (i.e. the black line) is the served demand
DS for the original power grid after cascading failures. The
points on the red curve refer to the DS value of each improved
grid that is obtained by adding one single line to the original
network.
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Fig. 1: The performance of the effective graph resistance in
IEEE 57, IEEE 118 power system with the tolerance parameter
α = 2.
The performance of the effective graph resistance as a
metric for link addition and the performance of strategies
are labelled in the Figure 1 with markers. The added line
that minimizes the effective graph resistance increases the
robustness from 0.41 to 0.80 and improves the robustness by
95%. Compared to the possibly maximal increase 0.86 by a
single link addition, the effective graph resistance achieves
93% accuracy in the IEEE 57 power system. Similarly in
IEEE 118 power system, the added line that minimizes the
effective graph resistance increases the robustness from 0.66
to 0.81. The effective graph resistance achieves 87% accuracy
identifying the optimal line in the IEEE 118 power system.
In Figure 1, the curve above the horizontal line shows an
increase of the robustness after a link addition, while the curve
below the horizontal line presents a decrease of the robustness
by adding a link. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is linked
to Braess’s paradox known for traffic networks, stating that
adding extra capacity or links to a network occasionally
reduces the overall performance of a network [2].
The simulation results in Figure 1 illustrate the effective-
ness of the effective graph resistance to identify a critical
link. The addition of the critical link improves the robustness
of power grids regardless of the fact that the robustness
can be decreased according to Braess’s paradox. We further
investigate more details on Braess’s paradox in subsection
VI-C.
B. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies
To assess the effectiveness of the four strategies in Section
IV, the IEEE 118 power system, consisting of 118 buses and
186 lines, is considered as a use case. For each line identified
by each strategy, equation (6) is evaluated and its impact on
the effective graph resistance is determined. Table II shows the
lines to be added identified by strategies and their impact on
the decrease of RG.
Strategy line ID ∆RlG(%)
DegProd l87−117 9.0
PrinEigen l87−111 4.2
Fiedler l111−117 11.3
EffectiveResis l87−117 9.0
TABLE II: Added lines identified by the strategies and their
impact on the decrease of RG.
In Table II, the strategy based on the Fiedler vector selects
the line connecting bus 111 and bus 117 and its addition causes
11.3% decrease of the effective graph resistance. Strategies
based on the degree product and the effective resistance have
an equal performance that decrease the effective graph resis-
tance by 9%. The strategy based on the principle eigenvector
decreases the effective graph resistance by 4.2%. Compared
to other strategies, the strategy based on the Fiedler vector
performs the best.
To validate the results from Table II, the original and
improved IEEE 118 power systems are attacked based on
the electrical node significance and the link betweenness, and
damages after cascading failures are quantified. The improved
power system refers to the system after adding a transmission
line identified by strategies in Section IV. Figures 2 and 3
show the robustness curves for improved power grids under an
interval of tolerance parameters [αmin, αmax] with ∆α = 0.05,
and highlight the improvement of the grid robustness. In order
to quantify the performance of the four strategies in improving
the grid robustness, the robustness value r in equation (7) for
each robustness curve is shown in Table III.
Figure 2 and Table III show the performance of the
strategies in the IEEE 118 power grid under the attack based
on the node significance. The strategy based on the Fiedler
vector has a robustness value r = 0.777 which is an increase
by 1.8% compared to the original grid robustness (i.e. 0.763).
The strategy based on the degree product and on the effective
resistance have an equal performance. These two strategies
have the same robustness value r = 0.769 and increase
the robustness by 0.8%. The strategy based on the principle
eigenvector has the lowest performance and its robustness
value is r = 0.757 that decreases the robustness by 0.8%.
Figure 3 and Table III present the performance of the
strategies under the betweenness based attack. The strategy
based on the Fiedler vector has the highest robustness value
r = 0.991, which is an increase by 8.2% compared to the
original grid robustness (i.e. 0.916). The strategy based on
the degree product and on the effective resistance have an
equal performance with the same robustness value r = 0.949.
The robustness is increased by 3.6% compared to the original
grid robustness. In contrast, the strategy based on the principle
eigenvector with r = 0.915 slightly decreases the robustness
by 0.1%. The performance order of the strategies shown in
Figures 2 and 3 and Table III is in agreement with the
theoretical results in Table II.
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Fig. 2: The performance of the four strategies in IEEE 118
power system under different tolerance parameters. The attack
strategy is based on the node significance centrality.
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Fig. 3: The performance of the four strategies in IEEE 118
power system under different tolerance parameters. The attack
strategy is based on betweenness centrality.
When the computational cost for finding the optimal links
to add is prohibitive, the strategy based on the Fiedler vector
Strategy line ID r r(Node Siginificance attack) (Betweenness attack)
DegProd l87−117 0.769 0.949
PrinEigen l87−111 0.757 0.915
Fiedler l111−117 0.777 0.991
EffectiveResis l87−117 0.769 0.949
TABLE III: Critical lines identified by the four strategies and
the robustness value r in IEEE 118 power system.
with the highest performance is preferable compared to other
strategies. Assuming that computing the Fiedler vector for
large grids is not an option, the strategy based on the degree
product can be an alternative. The degree based strategy is
more likely to be chosen than the strategy based on the
effective resistance due to the fact that these two strategies
have comparable performance, while the strategy based on the
degree product has lower computational complexity.
C. Assessing the impact of the grid topology on Braess’s
paradox
Braess’s paradox in this paper refers to the decrease of
grid robustness by placing additional links. The relationship
between the grid topology and the Braess’s paradox in power
grids is investigated.
The Wheatstone bridge graph (shown in Figure 4) refers
to a graph consisting of four nodes, with four links creating
a quadrilateral. A fifth link connects two opposite nodes in
the quadrilateral, splitting the graph into two triangles [3].
We consider the subgraph with four nodes and four links as
the Wheatstone subgraph and the fifth link as the Wheat-
stone link. Braess’s paradox indicates that the construction
of the Wheatstone bridge graph by adding the Wheatstone
link occasionally decreases the robustness of power grids. Let
PWheatstone represent the percentage of the Wheatstone links and
PParadox be the percentage of the links, whose addition results
in Braess’s paradox. In order to investigate the impact of the
Wheatstone bridge graph on Braess’s paradox, the correlation
between the percentages PWheatstone and PParadox is quantified.
The number of Wheatstone links is computed by the number
of Wheatstone bridge subgraphs detected by FANMOD [29],
a tool for fast network motif detection.
Fig. 4: Wheatstone bridge graph
Figure 5 shows two types, Type I and Type II, of Wheat-
stone subgraphs from which a Wheatstone bridge graph is built
by adding the Wheatstone link (the dashed line). For each
subgraph, the number of the Wheatstone links is two times
the total number of subgraphs of Type I and Type II. The
percentage PWheatstone of Wheatstone links in all the possible
added links Lc is computed by PWheatstone = 2(NTypeI+NTypeII)Lc ,
where NTypek is the number of subgraphs of Type k. Table
IV shows the percentage PWheatstone of Wheatstone links and
the percentage PParadox in Figure 1. The correlation between
PWheatstone and PParadox is 0.96 suggesting the criticality of the
Wheatstone bridge graph (see Figure 4) to the occurrence of
Braess’s paradox.
(a) Type I (b) Type II
Fig. 5: Two types of subgraphs to build a Wheatstone bridge
graph by adding the Wheatstone link. The dashed lines are the
possible Wheatstone links.
Besides the Wheatstone bridge graph that occasionally
introduce Braess’s paradox [1], we further investigate other
subgraphs that may lead to the Braess’s paradox. Figure 6
shows other three types, Type III to Type V, of subgraphs
resulting in Braess’s paradox when a single link is added.
The dashed lines in Figure 6 are the possible links that cause
the Braess’s paradox. Table V shows the percentage PWheatstone
after including the number of links added into Type III, IV and
V. The percentage PWheatstone increases from 6.73% to 25.00%
in IEEE 57 power system. An increase of the PWheatstone from
4.53% to 15.44% is also observed in IEEE 118 and from
1.34% to 4.11% in IEEE 247 power system. Accordingly, the
correlation between PWheatstone and PParadox increases to 0.971.
The results indicate that the subgraphs from Type I to Type
V provide an effective indication for the occurrence of the
Braess’s paradox in power grids.
(a) Type III (b) Type IV (c) Type V
Fig. 6: Three types of subgraphs resulting in Braess’s paradox
by adding an extra link.
IEEE57 IEEE118 IEEE247
Lc 1516 6717 30026
NTypeI 0 20 30
NTypeII 51 132 171
PWheatstone(%) 6.73 4.53 1.34
PParadox (%) 53.16 20.67 4.57
TABLE IV: The percentage PWheatstone and PParadox in IEEE
power systems
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper investigates the effective graph resistance as a
metric for network expansions to improve the grid robustness
against cascading failures. The effective graph resistance takes
IEEE57 IEEE118 IEEE247
NTypeIII 95 256 299
NTypeIV 91 216 255
NTypeV 0 15 8
PWheatstone(%) 25.00 15.44 4.11
TABLE V: The percentage PWheatstone and PParadox in IEEE
power systems
the multiple paths and their ability to accommodate power
flows into account to quantify the robustness of power grids.
The experimental verification on IEEE power systems demon-
strates the effectiveness of the effective graph resistance to
identify single links that improve the grid robustness against
cascading failures. Additionally, when computational cost for
finding optimal links is prohibitive, strategies that optimize
the effective graph resistance can still identify an added link
resulting in a higher level of robustness. Specifically, the strat-
egy based on the Fiedler vector performs the best compared to
other strategies and increases the robustness by 8.2% in IEEE
118 power system under the betweenness based attack, while
reduces the computational complexity from O(N5) to O(N3).
The occurrence of Braess’s paradox in power grids suggests
that the robustness can be occasionally decreased by placing
additional links. In particular, a badly designed power grid may
cause enormous costs for new lines that actually reduce the
grid robustness. The experimental results in this paper provide
insights in designing robust power grids while avoiding the
Braess’s paradox in power grids.
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